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Abstract   
Abstract: Whilst the properties of decision regret have been widely explored in 
experimental and game theoretic studies, the empirical features of regret from large-scale 
‘binary decision’ national events in practice have garnered less scrutiny. This study is an 
empirical investigation of novel survey data reporting ‘Brexit’ voting choices and expressions 
of a desire to change voting choices post-referendum. We investigate if Leave voters are 
more or less likely to express a change to their binary referendum vote choice than those 
who voted Remain or abstained and then identify the particular characteristics of those who 
regret their vote choice. A large-scale pan-European survey is used to capture citizens’ 
perceptions of the European Union containing 17,147 interviews of adults from 15 EU 
member states. Using responses from UK citizens (n =1,500), focus is directed to the vote 
choice for the ‘Brexit’ referendum and the corresponding choice if the referendum were 
held ‘today’. Probit regression estimation identifies the key differences in the characteristics 
of those who expressed regret by indicating a desire to change voting choices. Results show 
that permanence of residential location, knowledge of EU funding policies, educational 
attainment, employment status and income are key drivers for regretting the referendum 
voting decision. 
 
Key words: Regret, Brexit, vote choice, referendum 
Declaration of funding: Dataset and analysis funded as part of a Horizon 2020 project, 
PERCEIVE: Perception and Evaluation of Regional and Cohesion Policies by Europeans and 
Identification with the Values of Europe. GA No. 693529.  
1 
 
A Picture of Regret: An Empirical Investigation of 




Abstract: Whilst the properties of decision regret have been widely explored in 
experimental and game theoretic studies, the empirical features of regret from large-scale 
‘binary decision’ national events in practice have garnered less scrutiny. This study is an 
empirical investigation of novel survey data reporting ‘Brexit’ voting choices and expressions 
of a desire to change voting choices post-referendum. We investigate if Leave voters are 
more or less likely to express a change to their binary referendum vote choice than those who 
voted Remain or abstained and then identify the particular characteristics of those who regret 
their vote choice. A large-scale pan-European survey is used to capture citizens’ perceptions 
of the European Union containing 17,147 interviews of adults from 15 EU member states. 
Using responses from UK citizens (n =1,500), focus is directed to the vote choice for the 
‘Brexit’ referendum and the corresponding choice if the referendum were held ‘today’. Probit 
regression estimation identifies the key differences in the characteristics of those who 
expressed regret by indicating a desire to change voting choices. Results show that 
knowledge of EU funding policies, permanence of residential location, population size of the 
local area, educational attainment, employment status, and income are key drivers for 
regretting the referendum voting decision. 
 





1. Introduction and Context 
The properties of decision regret have been widely explored in experimental and game 
theoretic work (see, for example, Schlag and Zapechelnyuk, 2012 and Sautua, 2017). The 
empirical features and properties of regret from large-scale ‘binary decision’ national events 
in practice have garnered less scrutiny. In the United Kingdom on 23rd June 2016, an 
advisory binary referendum took place on the question of whether the country should remain 
or leave the European Union (EU). The results were very close and comprised 51.89% voting 
to leave the EU and 48.11% to remain in the EU. The turnout was 72.21% of the electorate. 
Much popular media narrative and follow up polls indicated that the vote outcome would 
likely have been reversed just a few weeks later (Bol et al., 2018).  
 
That a large number of people regretted their initial decision is potentially significant in terms 
of garnering public support in the Brexit negotiation process and for various deal outcomes. 
This study does not dwell on the multitude of reasons considered to have led to so many to 
vote leave (see, for example, Curtice, 2016, 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Meleady, Seger 
and Vermue, 2017; Abrams and Travaglino, 2018). Nor does it focus on the systemic 
political and institutional repercussions arising from Brexit (see, for example, Caporaso, 2018 
and Moravcsik, 2018). Instead, it focuses on empirical findings from an analysis of UK 
citizens questioned within a large Pan-European survey about attitudes to various EU policies 
(Bauhr and Charron, 2018; Bauhr and Charron, 2019).  
 
That UK sub-sample were additionally asked about their vote in the 2016 referendum and 
what would they vote if the referendum were held ‘today’. In this way, those who changed 
their mind and regretted their decision could be identified and their general characteristics 
discerned. This novel data allows us to investigate if Leave voters are more or less likely to 
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express a change to their binary referendum vote choice than those who voted Remain or 
abstained from voting. We are then able to identify the particular characteristics of those who 
regret their vote choice. 
 
These characteristics are explored by regression analysis and by means of statistical 
disaggregation displayed visually in a series of charts. Results show that the characteristics of 
those more likely to regret their voting decision are those who have less knowledge of the 
major EU policy funding streams, have lived in the same area for a shorter period of time, 
live in a less populated area, have lower educational attainment, are unemployed, and earn a 
low income.  
 
The next section briefly sets in context the analysis of vote choice regret to help guide the 
commentary on the statistical analysis of regret that is later unfolded. Section 3 sets out the 
data and methodology underpinning the study. The following section then presents and 
discusses the results emerging from the statistical analysis. A summary and concluding 
remarks are offered in the final section. 
 
2. Vote Regret in Retrospect 
The literature providing analyses of voting is vast, both in theoretical and empirical terms 
(see, for examples of some surveys, Paldam, 1981; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis‐Beck 
and Stegmaier 2007, 2013; Giordani, et al., 2010). More recently, attention has been drawn to 
the role of both instrumental and expressive voting in elections or combinations of both 
motivations. Bol et al. (2018) develop a ‘mixed utility’ theory of vote choice regret to apply 
in the context of multiple party elections. For them, voter utilities stem from a mix of 
‘expressive’ voting (how much the voter likes the party they voted for) and ‘instrumental’ 
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voting (how much the vote makes a difference to the party that is elected). In ‘pure’ 
expressive voting, less account might be taken of the probability of winning (Drinkwater and 
Jennings, 2007). In ‘pure’ instrumental voting there is some mental calculation of the 
probability of a given party winning the election, such that they can attempt to influence 
which party wins. It is also argued that expressive voters may take the probability of winning 
into account if the individual voters are pivotal to the outcome (Brennan and Hamlin, 1998).  
 
For instrumental and mixed utility voters, who are partly expressive and partly instrumental, 
regret can emerge from poorly calculating the probability of electoral success. Clearly, in the 
context of a binary referendum with few precedents and on issues that cut across political 
party lines, the likelihood of not accurately calculating the probability of a particular given 
referendum outcome is arguably even greater than for multi-party political elections. In these 
circumstances, centring on an ostensibly binary decision matter, more expressive voting 
could be posited as more likely to feature in an individual voter’s decision process.  
 
As formal theories of regret, Savage (1951) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) may well offer 
lenses to examine Brexit vote regret. However, this paper is an empirical investigation about 
regret at an intuitive level, which is captured by the voting decision changes when new 
information is received. As such, there is no fundamental requirement for a theoretical 
underpinning of regret beyond the calculation of the loss from not choosing the best response. 
In a nutshell, did binary referendum voters anticipate regret and accordingly take account of 
it in their referendum choice in their desire to eliminate or minimise the possibility? 
Specifically, are Leave voters less likely to express a change to their binary referendum vote 
choice than those who voted Remain or those who abstained from voting? If so, what are the 




3. Data  
Use is made of a dataset built from a large-scale pan European survey conducted by Bauhr 
and Charron (2018) to capture citizens’ perceptions of the European Union1. The sample 
includes 17,147 interviews of adults from 15 EU member states, who were contacted 
randomly via telephone in the local language. The dataset includes demographic information 
on gender, age, education, time lived in residence, population, income, and employment. The 
two questions that are of interest to us were collected from UK citizens only, receiving 1,500 
responses: 
Q1. What did you vote in the BREXIT referendum?  
Q2. If the referendum were held today, how would you vote?  
 
In the following analysis, a change of voting decision between Q1 and Q2 is intuitively used 
to measure regret. In this sense, regret is the amount that someone wishes to change their 
voting decision when receiving more information. A full description of the survey sample and 
the weights used are detailed in Bauhr and Charron (2018). In summary, interviews were 
conducted by telephone calls to households during the summer of 2017, approximately one 
year on from the referendum. Respondents were randomly drawn and are selected by the 
‘next birthday’ method within the household. To compensate for demographic over/under-
representation, weights based on age and gender were constructed by comparing the sample 
to statistics from Eurostat. Table 1 shows the sample distribution: 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
1This dataset was produced as part of a Horizon 2020 European Union Funding for Research and Innovation 
project: Perception and Evaluation of Regional and Cohesion policies by Europeans and Identification with the 
Values of Europe (PERCEIVE), GA nr. 693529. 
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Notably, the UK survey more heavily samples citizens voting to Remain. As such, we use the 
results from the EU referendum 2016 to add to the existing demographic and regional 
weights in the following manner. The EU referendum turnout (of valid votes) was 33,551,983 
(16,141,241 remain and 17,410,742 leave), which is 64.8% of the UK voting age population 
(51,767,543 from the Office for National Statistics 2016 mid-year population estimates). 
Weighting the remain and leave sample by the EU voter turnout (64.81%) and accounting for 
the under-sampled non-voters (35.19%) weights are calculated as follows: 
1. Remain weights = (0.4811*0.6481)/0.5507 = 0.5662 
2. Leave weights = (0.5189*0.6481)/ 0.2949 = 1.1404 
3. Abstain weights = 0.3519/0.1544 = 2.2791 
These weights are incorporated within the existing demographic and regional weights 
detailed in Bauhr and Charron (2018).  
 
To explore voter characteristics, we make use of responses to questions about gender; 
education; age; income; working status; size of the place of living (population); permanence 
(number of years spent in the same place), perception of economic trends in the previous 5 
years; and knowledge of EU policies (Cohesion Policy (CP), Regional Policy (RP), and 
Structural Funds (SF)). Responses to the knowledge of EU policies should be taken with the 
caveat that the survey does not require a base line knowledge test to check people’s actual 
knowledge, instead we rely on self-reported educational attainment as a control. 
 
Responses to these questions allow for analysis of the effects of economic variables related to 
the knowledge of EU main policies and the overall expectation about the economic cycle, 
whilst controlling for socio-economic characteristics of respondents. A full list of the 
variables used from this survey is presented in Table 2. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
To answer the question are Leave voters less likely to express a change to their binary 
referendum vote choice than those who voted Remain or those who abstained from voting?, 
we scrutinise the survey responses and present a visual analysis of characteristics behind 
voting decisions and their change.  This is followed by formal statistical modelling of the 
referendum vote and voting regret using Seeming Unrelated Probit regression. This method 
allows for identification of the statistically significant factors, from variables in Table 2, 
which contribute towards the likelihood of a person regretting their vote choice. Since the 
main objective of the proposed model does not lie in the prediction of the referendum 
outcome per se, but, rather, in detecting the effect of selected variables based on theoretical 
arguments, the regression exercise does not apply methods for model selection such as lasso 




This section sets out the findings regarding the extent of expressed changes of voting choice 
then explores the characteristics of those expressing vote choice regret.  As outlined, change 
is discerned via responses to these two questions: Q1 What did you vote in the Brexit 
referendum?; Q2 If the referendum were held today, how would you vote? The breakdown of 
responses to these two questions as a proportion of the weighted sample (1,500) is set out in 
Table 3. 




Those who did not change their decision between Q1 and Q2 account for 71.3% of the 
sample population. Accordingly, 28.7% did change their decision and for the following 
analysis we define this change as voting regret.  
 
If the Q2 decision was in fact a true referendum vote then the result would be Remain 57.2% 
and Leave 42.8% (of valid votes), showing a key swing towards Remain from the referendum 
of June 2016. Only a small proportion of the sample changed from leave to remain (2% of 
sample), indeed, the largest change is seen in those who abstained in Q1, wishing to become 
electorally active in Q2. 30.3% of the sample in Q1 declared that they abstained from voting, 
this falls to 7.8% in Q2. Some of those who abstained in Q1 chose Leave (5%) in Q2, 
however, far more chose Remain (17.3%) in Q2. Whilst it could be argued that Leave voters 
should have greater regret (measured by the numbers of people changing decision), as those 
who abstained perhaps had no interest in the original referendum outcome, this result shows 
that it is not Leave voters who have greater regret, instead it is those who abstained. This 
indicates that it is the lack of participation in the vote that is being regretted, based on the 
events following the referendum outcome.  
 
4.1 A picture of voting decisions 
The corresponding proportions of these categories (no change, abstain>remain, etc.) are 
shown within each NUTS 1 geographical region of the UK in Figure 1. Compared to other 
regions, the North West has the highest proportion of people regretting their original 
decision. Here, 40.3% regretted their choice, the majority of whom changed from Abstain to 
Remain, whereas only 12.6% of people residing in Northern Ireland regretted their choice. 
The highest proportions of Abstain to Remain voters are seen in Yorkshire and the Humber, 
London, and the North West regions (27%, 24.7%, 24.2% of region population, respectively). 
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The highest proportion of those who changed from Abstain to Leave reside in Wales (13.8%). 
Using Q2, all regions except Essex, North East, Northern Ireland, and West Midlands would 
see a swing towards Remain significant enough to overturn the referendum vote.  
[Figure 1 about here]  
 
Figures 2 a-h present respondent characteristics (gender, education, age, occupation, local 
population size, income, and economic outlook) by categories of their change in voting 
choices from Q1 to Q2 (no change, regret, abstain>remain etc.). Of those who changed their 
choice (28.7% of population sample) 52.6% are male. More males than females chose to 
change from Refuse to Remain (79.8%) and Abstain to Remain (56.8%), whilst females are 
the majority of those who changed between Leave to Remain (69.8%). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Of those regretting, 54.3% have a college or University education. A far smaller proportion 
of those changing from Abstain to Leave have a Postgraduate qualification (10.1%) whereas 
a high proportion of Refuse to Remain indeed have such qualifications. Over 44% of those 
changing decision are 30-49 years of age and those changing from Remain to Leave tended to 
be older, approximately half (50.9%) of this group are 50 years or older. Of the Refuse to 
Remain group, most (84.9%) are younger. Of the Leave to Remain group, the proportions are 
roughly equal across age categories.   
 
27.6% of those who regretted are working in the private sector and the highest proportion of 
private sector workers feature in the Refuse to Remain group. The self-employed form the 
majority of the Abstain to Leave group. The highest proportion of ‘housewives’ is seen in the 
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Leave to Remain category (25.9%). Whereas, 34.9% of the Remain to Leave group are 
pensioners.  
 
Of those regretting, 39.2% live in a small town or city. Almost half (48.3%) of the Refuse to 
Remain category are living in a very large city with a local population greater than 1,000,000. 
In contrast, 38.9% of the Remain to Leave category are living in rural areas (less than 10,000 
people) and 43.3% of the group are low-income households. 
 
44% of those regretting perceive a worsening economic situation compared to 5 years ago. 
Indeed, 56.5% of the Leave to Remain and 48.8% of the Abstain to Remain categories 
perceived the economy to be worse off. The highest proportion of those perceiving an 
improving (better) economic situation compared to 5 years ago are in the Remain to Leave 
group. Furthermore, a high proportion of those who associated with Leave (Abstain>Leave, 
Remain>Leave) incorrectly believe the UK to be outside of the wealthiest 25% of EU 
regions.  
 
4.2 Probit analysis 
To explore the main drivers of both voting leave in the referendum and voting regret, Leave 
and Regret are used as dependent variables in separate seemingly unrelated bivariate Probit 
models and regressed against the set of explanatory variables presented in Table 2. Models 1 
and 2 use the dependent variable Leave, a binary term equal to 1 if the respondent voted 
‘Leave’ in the referendum and equal to 0 otherwise. Models 3-5 use the dependent variable 
Regret, which indicates the decision to abstain from the referendum (Q1) and change to vote 
remain (Q2). In principle, the case of voting regret stemming from voting to leave in the 
referendum should be treated separately from those choosing to abstain. Therefore, the model 
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conceptually separates between those who voted leave but would now vote remain, and those 
who abstained but would now vote remain. Since the majority (80%) of vote regret are from 
those who abstained in the Brexit referendum, only these are used in regression analysis.   
 
Since 4.7% and 4.9% refused to answer the questions 1 and 2 respectively, Models 1 and 3 
use a Stochastic imputation method (von Hippel and Lynch, 2013) based on the variables 
Education, Income, Knowledge of Regional Policy, and Economic trend to impute the 
missing responses for the exercise of running the Seemingly Unrelated Regression. Models 2, 
4 and 5 provide robustness checks as the same estimation for Leave and Regret without the 
imputed values. 
 
The categorical variables used in the regression analysis (Age, Education, Working Status, 
Size, and Income) have been entered with reference to a particular default group as follows: 
those aged 65+; lowest level of education in the sample (Elementary (primary) school or less 
(no diploma) or High (secondary) school (but did not graduate from it); pensioners; smallest 
(rural) area; and the higher income group, respectively. Therefore, for each variable the 
estimated coefficient shows the eventual change due to an individual departing from the 
reference categories for each group. 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Probit regression estimation results are shown in Table 4 and corresponding average marginal 
effects in Table 52.  
                                                 
2 Probit coefficients reported in Table 4 are different from the marginal effects on probability reported in Table 
5. The non-linearity of the model can produce a paradoxical effect where a variable has significant effect in the 
original Probit model but the marginal effect is not significant. Notwithstanding the complexity involved in 
calculating the standard error of the marginal effect in a multiple equation model (Dowd et al., 2014) such as a 
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It could be argued that greater knowledge of EU policies increases the identification and the 
support to the EU discourse, therefore decreasing the probability of voting Leave and also 
decreasing voting regret. Indeed, a greater knowledge of Regional Policy reduces the 
probability of voting Leave in the referendum. Similarly, a greater knowledge of Cohesion 
Policy reduces the likelihood voting regret. Knowledge of Regional Policy and Structural 
Funds shows as having a positive and statistically significant impact on regret in Model 4, 
however, this is not reflected in either of the other two specifications.  
 
The number of years spent living in the same area has a highly statistically significant impact 
(at more than 1%) in each model, increasing the probability of voting Leave and decreasing 
the likelihood of regret. As each model controls for the age of respondent, permanence is 
capturing a lack of mobility and a sense of local community. Suggesting that not being 
exposed to new social environments makes it less likely that an individual will regret their 
decision once new information is made available.  
 
The probability of voting Leave could decrease as predictions about the economic outlook 
worsen and expectations about a better scenario might increase the probability of voting 
leave. It can be argued that some people would consider taking potential advantage of the 
positive trend to a greater extent when outside of the EU. For example, if they consider they 
might benefit from lower levels of external regulation and by avoiding contributions to the 
                                                 
bivariate Probit, when computing the marginal effects, the model considers a mix of relatively large and 
relatively small, statistically significant and non-significant marginal effects. No single marginal effect is being 
tested as the value of the marginal effect is contingent on how the values of the other variables in the model 
are set. As it is well-known, graphically, this is reflected by the steep central part of the Probit curve and the 
flat sections at the ends Greene (2009). Hence, in our analysis, while focusing on the coefficients, we deem 
relevant both the information regarding the coefficients and the marginal effects. Furthermore, it is worth 
noticing that this approach is consistent with the random utility approach (Greene, 2012) for which, in each 
voting occasion (the actual referendum and the hypothetical one)  the observed choice between the two, 
based on both characteristics and attributes  reveals which one provides the greater utility, but not the 
underlying unobservable utilities.    
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EU budget (e.g. the “let's give our NHS the £350 million the EU takes every week” 
argument). Indeed, being part of the EU allows benefiting from an insurance effect (i.e. 
spreading the risk) arising from partnership in a wider organisation. Perception of the 
economic trend is found to be highly significant in the referendum equation. Indeed, 
expressing the feeling that the economic situation would be the same or worse decreases the 
probability of voting Leave. This evidence suggests that the economy played some role in the 
choice about remaining or not in the EU by partially incorporating the potential negative 
consequences of the course of Brexit. However, a relationship with perceptions about 
economic outlook does not robustly appear to influence voting regret. Meaning that 
perceiving the local economy to be worse now than five years ago does not change the 
likelihood of regretting the voting decision.  
 
Compared to those with only a primary education, holding a post-graduate degree (e.g. a 
Master or a PhD) decreases the likelihood of regret and also probability of voting Leave. 
Building on Hobolt (2016), this result is excepted as typically higher education signifies the 
ability to assimilate information and the integrity of sources of information. Similarly, 
unemployment appears statistically significant in each Model (3-5) showing that unemployed 
people are more likely to regret their voting decision compared to those retired from work. 
Furthermore, belonging to the low-income-group has a positive statistical impact on the 
probability of vote regret. Combined, these results indicate the significant influence of 
education and income driving the likelihood to regret the voting decision.  
 
Compared to small rural areas, living in more urban areas such as towns and cities increases 
the probability of vote regret, with coefficient increasing with the population size. However, 
this appears not to be significant when considering the average margin effect. Moreover, a 
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similar general insignificance of the categories controlling for the population size is 
registered for the referendum. Finally, whilst it could be expected that younger people maybe 
less prone to vote Leave, neither age or gender appear to offer any statistically significant 
impact on the referendum choice nor on the successive expression of regret.  
 
Based on these results and the representative sample of 1,500 individuals considered here, the 
characteristics of those more likely to regret their voting decision are those who: 
• have less knowledge of the major EU policy funding streams; 
• have lived in the same area for a shorter period of time; 
• live in a less populated area; 
• have lower educational attainment; 
• are unemployed; 
• earn a low income.  
 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This study uses responses from a novel household survey conducted one year on from the UK 
referendum to leave or remain in the EU. Questions in this survey ask responds to report their 
referendum vote and what their vote would be at the time of survey (summer 2017). Through 
these responses, this study is able to identify those who change their decision and analyse the 
characteristics of those most likely to regret their original vote decision. Results show that, 
knowledge of EU funding policies, permanence of residential location, population size of the 
local areas, educational attainment, employment status, and income are key drivers for 




This study finds that a year on from the ‘Brexit’ referendum there is evidence that the overall 
result would be overturned should a second vote be held. Relatively few Leave voters would 
change their original vote choice. The main source of change in voter behaviour emerges 
from abstainers becoming electorally active. Arguably, the voting behaviour of these 
individuals is likely harder to predict such that the actual extent of any changed voting 
outcome might well be slimmer than the results in this study would indicate. However, the 
march of time and the typically older demographic profile of Leave voters would mean that 
there would be less of the original Leave voters alive such that just some more electorally 
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Table 1: Sample responses to ‘What did you vote in the BREXIT referendum?’ 
 







Remain 55.07% 16,141,241 31.18% 48.11% 
Leave 29.49% 17,410,742 33.63% 51.89% 
Abstained/refused  15.44% 18,215,560 35.19%  









































Table 2: Survey questions 
Variable Survey question (categories) 
  Please tell me your gender  
Gender  Female  
  Male  
    
  Please tell me what is the highest level in school you have completed 
Education Elementary (primary) school or less  
  High (secondary) school (but did not graduate) 
  Graduation from high (secondary) school 
  Graduation from college, university or other 
  Post-graduate degree (Masters, PHD) 
   (Don’t know/Refused) 
    
  Please tell me your age 
Age  Discrete 
  
 About how many years have you lived in the area where the interview was conducted? 
Permanence Discrete 
  
  Combined from 5 different questions about the working status in the survey  
Working status Employed in the public sector 
  Employed in the private sector 
  Self employed 
  Unemployed 
  Housewife / Houseman 
  Pensioner, retired 
  Student / Trainee 
   Other (workers not classifiable by status) 
    
  About how many people live in the place the interview was conducted? 
Size Less than 10,000 (rural) 
  10,000-100,000 (small town or city) 
  100,000-1,000,000 (large city or urban) 
  Greater than 1,000,000 (Very large city) 
  Don’t know/Refused  
    
  Please   tell me your average  total household net income  per month (after taxes) 
Income Discrete  
  
  In general, have you ever heard about the following EU policies?  
Cohesion Policy EU Cohesion Policy 
Regional Policy EU Regional Policy 
Structural Funds  EU Structural Funds 
    
  Compared with 5 years ago, do you think the economy in your region is:  
Economic trend Better 
  About the same  
  Worse 
Notes: Questions and categories reported in the second column refer to the work of Charron and Bauhr (2018) within the 
PERCEIVE project. Additional information from: http://www.perceiveproject.eu.  
Table 3: Distribution of referendum voting choices and decision ‘today’ – shown as % of total sample (1,500 people). 
 
  Q2: If the referendum were held today 




Remain 29.5% 1.2% 0.3% 0.2% 31.2% 
Leave 2.0% 31.1% 0.5% 0.1% 33.6% 
Abstain 17.3% 5.0% 7.1% 0.9% 30.3% 
Refused 1.3% 0.1% 0.0% 3.5% 4.9% 
Total 50.1% 37.5% 7.8% 4.7% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of referendum choice and voting regret 





Not using imputed 
values 
Regret 
(Abstain to Remain) 
Complete sample 
with imputed values 
Regret 




(Abstain to Remain) 
Not using imputed 
values 
Gender 











 (0.0716) (0.0734) (0.123) (0.267) (0.124) 
Education      
Elementary (primary) school or less (no 
diploma) or High (secondary) school (but 
did not graduate from it) 
Used as baseline - - - - 
Graduation from high (secondary) school 0.108 0.0872 -0.105            0.944* -0.116 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.243) (0.492) (0.245) 
Graduation from college, university or other 
third-level institute. 
-0.202 -0.225* -0.381 0.254 -0.380 
(0.132) (0.133) (0.235) (0.401) (0.236) 
Post-graduate degree (Masters, PhD)  -0.368** -0.377** -0.437* 0.616 -0.452* 
 (0.147) (0.148) (0.251) (0.460) (0.252) 
Don’t know/Refused -0.298 -0.334 -4.156*** - -4.191*** 
 (0.589) (0.590) (0.295)  (0.298) 
Age       
18-29 -0.233 -0.236 -0.0382 -0.377 -0.0411 
 (0.163) (0.166) (0.292) (0.581) (0.290) 
30-49 -0.222 -0.220 0.0685 -0.720 0.0764 
 (0.143) (0.146) (0.264) (0.543) (0.262) 
50-64 -0.191 -0.196* -0.123 -1.019** -0.122 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.225) (0.494) (0.224) 
65+ Used as baseline - - - - 
Permanence  0.00790*** 0.00820*** -0.0229*** -0.0241*** -0.0232*** 
 (0.00201) (0.00206) (0.00495) (0.00815) (0.00501) 
Working Status       
Public Sector  0.0440 0.0543 0.554** 0.643 0.550** 
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.237) (0.571) (0.236) 
Private Sector -0.0104 0.00906 0.332 0.355 0.339 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.228) (0.592) (0.227) 
Self-employed 0.222* 0.245* 0.428* 0.561 0.432* 
 (0.127) (0.128) (0.243) (0.545) (0.242) 
Unemployed -0.0951 -0.0711 0.799*** 1.235* 0.781*** 
 (0.211) (0.210) (0.288) (0.692) (0.287) 
Housewife/man 0.133 0.149 0.633 1.246 0.609 
 (0.305) (0.305) (0.516) (0.878) (0.515) 
Student -0.302 -0.304 0.640* 0.0627 0.660** 
 (0.261) (0.273) (0.328) (0.687) (0.329) 
Pensioner/retired Used as baseline - - - - 
Other (not classifiable by status) 0.216 0.250 -4.425*** - -4.405*** 
 (0.335) (0.336) (0.264)  (0.264) 
Size (Population)      
Less than 10,000 (rural) Used as baseline - - - - 
10,000-100,000 (small town or city) -0.0333 -0.00389 0.483** 0.489 0.473* 
 (0.0901) (0.0924) (0.203) (0.433) (0.204) 
100,000-1,000,000 (large city or urban area) -0.102 -0.0894 0.598*** 0.594 0.593*** 
 (0.108) (0.111) (0.222) (0.459) (0.223) 
Greater than 1,000,000 (Very large city or 
urban area) 
-0.119 -0.0703 0.694*** 0.727 0.673*** 
(0.120) (0.121) (0.230) (0.468) (0.231) 
Don’t know/Refused 0.549 0.388 0.774 0.833 0.817 
 (0.373) (0.397) (0.799) (1.208) (0.798) 
Income      
Low 0.0236 0.0417 0.409** 0.264 0.403** 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.169) (0.362) (0.169) 
Medium 0.0319 0.0487 0.230 0.127 0.234 
 (0.0879) (0.0898) (0.152) (0.327) (0.153) 
High Used as baseline - - - - 
Don’t know/Refused 0.166 0.202 -0.244 -0.499 -0.225 
 (0.146) (0.152) (0.321) (0.593) (0.321) 
Cohesion Policy 0.0125 0.00670 -0.394** -0.691* -0.391** 
 (0.0942) (0.0967) (0.174) (0.402) (0.176) 
Regional Policy -0.239*** -0.223** 0.0730 0.590* 0.0720 
 (0.0872) (0.0896) (0.155) (0.350) (0.156) 
Structural Funds  -0.0832 -0.0968 0.229 0.785** 0.226 
 (0.0946) (0.0965) (0.149) (0.370) (0.150) 
Economic trend      
Same -0.206** -0.226** 0.0152 -0.636** -0.0783 
 (0.0893) (0.0917) (0.153) (0.300) (0.159) 
Worse -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.0700 -0.352 -0.0194 











Observations 1,500 1,454 1,500 157 1,454 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 5: Determinants of voting regret - Average Marginal Effects 
 (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Regret 
(Abstain to Remain) 
Complete sample with imputed values 
Regret 
(Abstain to Remain) 
Using only abstainers 
Regret 
(Abstain to Remain) 
Not using imputed values  
    
Gender 







Education    
Elementary (primary) school or less (no diploma) OR High 
(secondary) school (but did not graduate from it) 
Used as baseline - - 














































Working Status     




































Pensioner/retired Used as baseline - - 




Size (Population)    
Less than 10,000 (rural) Used as baseline - - 





































High Used as baseline - - 










































Observations 1,500 157 1,454 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
 


















No Change Abstain>Remain Abstain>Leave Leave>Remain Refuse>Remain
Remain>Leave Abstain>Refuse Leave>Abstain Remain>Abstain Remain>Refuse
Refuse>Leave Leave>Refuse Refuse>Abstain





Figure 2c:   Age categories  
Figure 2b: Education levels  
 
 
Figure 2d: Occupation categories  
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Figure 2g: Perceptions of the Economy (compared to 5 years ago)  
 




Figure 2h:  Perception of UK GDP per capita compared to EU    
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